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[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organ-
ism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat
and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us
must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in
question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in
the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by
some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding
what that Amendment has reserved.
Justice Holmes, Missouri v. Holland.'
[The] principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has
the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, including the
vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition,
has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.
... The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states
which make up this federal free trade unit has been the most impres-
sive in the history of commerce, but the established interdependence
of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate
movement of goods against local burdens and repressions.
• . . Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise
every consumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such
was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.
Justice Jackson, H. P. Hood & Sons, Incorporated v. Du Mond.2
I. POPULAR SOVEREIGNS WANT DEMOCRACY TO WORK
The great American experiment of a government legitimized by
1. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
2. 336 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1949).
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popular sovereignty promised a government of law, not a government of
personal power or military force.3 Respect for the "popular sovereign"
State, thus requires an authentic democracy. Democracy in turn, must
be measured by actual practice in order to preserve accountability of
government under the Constitution.4 Citizens should therefore choose
their representatives confident that policies enacted into law will be set
in forums representing all those affected or "taxed." Thus, the demand
for popular sovereignty over a legally limited government derives
directly from the democratic principle animating the American Declara-
tion of Independence: No taxation without representation. This much
the Constitution requires of our democracy!'
Under this structural commitment to democracy, the extent of Con-
gressional power6 at the millennium will inevitably reflect the factual
reality of market organization as the socially chosen method of defining
the relationship between the division of labor and community life.
Empirically and historically, social stability depends, in part, on the cor-
relation between actual legitimization of the distribution of power and
the workability of the historical context of organization of economic and
social relations.7
The United States might have made constitutional choices other
than popular sovereignty. While such speculations are more fit for intel-
lectual sport, the fact is that commitment to democratic inclusion
requires a system of enacting laws that reflects the interest of all citi-
zens.8 Using the republican form of government as an excuse to insti-
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. Compare for example the German Supreme Court's decision upholding the
constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastrecht, subject only to future "federalistic" delegations of
power remaining consistent with the right to democracy embedded, although not in textual
language, in the German Constitution.
5. I take this truth as self-evident. There are many who demean popular sovereignty by
taking it to mean merely acquiescence in the current regime. Such an argument would justify all
regimes of government, and therefore none. In turn, all republican forms of government under
popular sovereignty require some explanation of their inherent democratic deficit. "Consent"
requires a differentiation from "acquiescence." Too often our Constitution's legitimacy has been
ignored by new aristocrats who would bend the Constitutional document to decrease institutional
responsibility to democratic forms. See John Hart Ely, The Apparent Inevitability of Mixed
Government, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (1999); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
The Author will defend authentic democracy as required by popular sovereignty. Those who
would start the legitimacy question assuming a more undemocratic principle should be forced to
defend the resulting inequalities and inequities as Constitutionally just.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. On history, see E.P. THOMPSON, "THE RULE OF LAW," WHIGS & HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN
OF THE BLACK ACTS 258 (1975).
8. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION PART III (1992);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS: 1776-1787 (1998).
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tute rule by aristocracy must be repudiated.9 Rather, healthy
legitimation of governance through democratic practices will be signi-
fied by the robust debate and compromise or conflict which is the
expected behavior of pluralistic majorities. Such pluralism embodies
diversity (almost literally) as instituted in multiple representative but
distinctly defined forums. The same pluralistic assumption requires
decisions to be made inclusively. Thus, without revoking a commitment
to democracy in government, and market organization of the economy,
the current material reality of a finance driven market of investments of
globally organized capital management can be politically regulated only
as a matter of foreign affairs.
Under the United States Constitution, such powers reside solely in
the Federal Government. They are prohibited to the states, first,
expressly; second, by the supremacy of the Constitution and Federal
law; and third, by the structure of the federalism required by the Consti-
tution. The great principle of popular sovereignty"° requires this Consti-
tutional outcome. The Declaration of Independence was based upon it.l'
The principle of "No taxation without representation" requires it. There-
fore, the Supremacy Clause requires it.' 2 The most important constitu-
tional opinion in Supreme Court history centers on it.' 3 Yet the present
Supreme Court seems to reject these democratic principles and is poised
to strike down the ability for the mass of the American population to
compete internationally. 14
This essay will confront the Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism,"
by arguing: First, the economic health of the American people, at least at
this historical point in time, depends on recognizing that the capitalist
form of State/Market organization of socio-economic relationships has
"won" on a global basis. 5 From this assumption, Section II of this
9. See supra note 5.
10. "We the People .... " U.S. CONST. Pmbl.
11. "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Cranch) 316 (1819).
14. For the problems globalization creates for democracy, see Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice
in the Age of Globalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167 (1999).
15. For those who would wish some other form of more egalitarian socio-economic
organization would replace the present regime, this essay's agenda argues: First, the working
population needs stable employment organizations in order to mobilize to increase and locate
human capital investment in their communities. Second, political powers of workers in alliances
will need to demand provision of educational and technical assistance from the State. These aims
can only be attained if democracy can be re-invigorated and subject to numerical majority
interests. Neither civil society, nor the State sector alone can effectively transform current social
practices. While in the short run such an agenda may seem imperial or insensitive to other
nation's workforces, effective democratization of other economies depends materially on
strengthening inclusive democratization in the United States. The agenda is not intended as giving
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essay describes the doctrinal backdrop of national power within such a
globally organized economy. Section III links Constitutional power to
the structure of the Rehnquist Court's system of interpretation. Further,
the essay argues that the global economy, absent a world regime, will be
shaped by Nation-State negotiation of terms of trade, labor standards,
etc., and nationally organized competitiveness policies. Section IV
reconnects the importance of competitiveness to democracy, particularly
to the people who work and depend upon the availability of work in the
new global labor markets. In this context, perhaps curiously, protecting
workers in this country will in the short term require promoting the suc-
cess of international investment in the United States in order to attract
geographically mobile production to regional labor pools. These labor
pools respect no state lines or municipal boundaries. They are regional
concentrations of population. Such population concentrations in mas-
sive urban areas potentially wield great voting power, unless thwarted
by balkanized district and municipality units. The United States
Supreme Court's "New Federalism," by privileging suburban enclaves
of wealth, and their residents' ability to exclude themselves from
regional problems, is exactly perverse to the coordinated multi-state
localism necessary to compete globally. Thus, promotion of American
workers' competitiveness and protecting labor standards simultaneously,
can only be pursued by democratic national control as a matter of for-
eign policy, and as procedurally required by the Compact Clause.1
6
II. COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS UNDER GLOBAL
FINANCE CAPITAL MARKETS
This self-inflicted danger to democracy exists even though the
Supreme Court at the beginning of the Rehnquist era reaffirmed the fed-
eral power to ensure national protection of American citizens' competi-
tion as a key commitment of the Constitution's design. In Michelin Tire
Corporation v. Wages Tax Commissioner, Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority, said:
[1] [t]he Federal Government must speak with one voice when regu-
lating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs,
which might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by
the States consistently with that exclusive power; [2] import revenues
were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government
and should not be diverted to the States; [3] and harmony among the
States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial
up on social transformation or as a tool of coopting worker formed political action. As Hegel
suggests, the way to overcome the present requires going through it and coming out the other side.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
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ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other
States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other
States not situated as favorably geographically. 7
Point [1] emphasizes the exclusively national character of foreign
commerce regulation, including reaching any activity affecting foreign
relations, and thus, the prohibition of local officials undertaking inde-
pendent intervention in those relations. Point [3] requires a form of the
principle, "No taxation without representation."
However, such recognition has not, prevented the Rehnquist Court
from promulgating its "New Federalism," a set of doctrines limiting
Congressional power constitutionally impossible to square with Miche-
lin's reasoning. Despite repeated failures to craft any workable doc-
trines supporting such gambits, 8 these new judicially invented
restrictions on democracy create Constitutional contradictions. Thus,
citizens, lawyers, and lower courts are left adrift, trying to settle cases of
conflicting state and national authority. This present status of Constitu-
tional confusion and contradiction is more than a matter of hard cases
and difficult interpretations. The corner into which the current Supreme
Court has painted us is due neither to accident, misunderstanding, nor
framer's myopia. It is time to conclude that the present Court's Consti-
tutional agenda of devolution of government to local enclaves of wealth
is simply wrong and harms all of us. 9
A. With Foreign Nations: The Capital of Finance Capital[s]
What role will American competitiveness play, positive or nega-
tive, in fitting into the new economic reality? As it develops, law, legal
institutions, legislated policies, regulations, tax and subsidy, will cer-
tainly both reflect and shape events and conflicts over this future. Yet,
historical change rarely appears in the heat and immediacy of the pre-
sent, usually becoming clear only in hindsight. For instance, it is now
commonplace to understand the 1970's as a watershed era of change in
the American polity, economy, and geo-politics. 20 At the time, war and
the civil rights movement precipitated intense political crises. Now, the
collapse of the American steel industry among others under international
17. 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's abandonment of the Tenth Amendment gambit of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160
(1992).
19. For elaboration on the new constitutional liberty as exhausted by exclusion from enclaves
of protected propertied wealth, see Kenneth Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The
Political Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247 (2000).
20. See RICHARD J. BARNETr & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER Part Three (1994).
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competition seems similarly pivotal. Along with the reorganization and
retrenchment of American industrial production, the beginning of the
service economy, and a half-hearted conversion from a war economy,
we also see the accompanying destruction of "good," stable, industrial
jobs initially fought for by industrial unions, which have virtually col-
lapsed. Over eighty percent of working Americans now work in the
services sector. Union penetration of the labor market currently stands
at about fourteen percent and only six and a half percent of the service
industry is unionized. That is down from a high of approximately thirty-
five percent of the work force in the 1950's.21 Not surprisingly, the
average family income is now no more in real dollar terms than in
1975.22
What remains seldomly recognized is that international industrial
competition over cheaper labor and environmental costs has promoted a
continuing race to the bottom of production costs. 23 We might have
predicted these changes as the inevitable result of the shift from indus-
trial control of capitalism under regional geographic control, to the dom-
inance of international finance in investment decisions.24 Yet our
society now has awoken and laments the complete lack of national or
geographic loyalty of capital flows.25 In part, due to flexible assembly/
production, short term gains can be realized by moving to cheaper labor
costs. The world economy now faces a worldwide production over-
capacity similar to what effectively caused the Great Depression of the
1920-30's. Thus, investment now shifts from low wage production in
leading developing countries to even lower wage populations elsewhere,
leaving behind still competitive production facilities and populations
with rising standard of living expectations. 26 This leap-frog game now
bows to finance investment rather than production itself.27 While finan-
cial investors seek maximum short-term returns, the concentration of
21. For an explanation of the legal role in this decline, see Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer:
Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REv I
(1990).
22. See Simon Head, The New Ruthless Economy, N.Y. REVIEW, Feb. 29, 1996, at 47.
23. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 136 (1999).
24. See Timothy A. Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility and the Limits of
the Orthodox Imagination: A Critique of Robert Solomon, Money on the Move: The Revolution in
International Finance Since 1980, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 221 (2000).
25. On the effects on government and consequences for citizens, see SASKIA SASSEN,
GLOBALIZATION AND 'rs DISCONTENTS (1998); on workers, see Maria L. Ontiveros, A Vision of
Global Capitalism That Puts Women and People of Color at the Center, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 27 (1999).
26. See David McNally, Globalization on Trial: Crisis and Class Struggle in East Asia,
MONTHLY REVIEW, Sept. 1998, at 1.
27. GLOBAL UNEMPLOYMENT: Loss OF JOBS IN THE 1990's (J. Eatwell ed., 1996)
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economic power is even more centralized, private, non-geographical,
and subject to little Nation-State control.2 8 Moreover, financial mobil-
ity, alone among the factors of production, moves instantaneously and
invisibly in the digitized world.
There is no doubt that most of the services and goods produced in
America are still consumed domestically. But, the health, stability, and
relative value of all economic activity in our domestic economy will
inevitably and increasingly depend on trade balances, the velocity of
money, currency valuation, and access to internationalized capital pools.
All of these factors involve substantial government policy formation and
representation in foreign negotiations.
At what political level will our national competitiveness policy be
legislated? Will the servicing of capital flows and their managers be
centered in the United States? In response to the current economic real-
ity, where does the interest of our nation and citizens rest today? It
seems that in the near future, investment capital driven by short-term
maximization will be subject to attempted capture by highly diversified
trade blocs.2 9 The European Community currently races ahead of other
potential blocs in terms of political institutions and infrastructure. The
Eastern Asian rim, while politically anarchic and faced with the sleeping
giant of China, seems another likely group. Both possesses a finance
capital in Germany and Japan respectively. All of this occurs while the
United States, standing alone, remains powerful. However, even so, this
country has pushed through NAFTA as a counter free trade zone for
North America.3" All three trade blocs though are centered on lead
nations of the so-called first world.
If the obvious self-interest of the American hemispheres comes to
fruition, the capital of finance for the region will reside in the most eco-
nomically stable and powerful country, the United States. Leadership is
ours' to lose. But, a free trade market, by definition, makes it possible
for the United States to lose. Finance needs services and high technol-
ogy. Such market infrastructure in the computer age is highly mobile.
The ability of the United States to remain the economic center of the
world will depend on sufficient investment in human capital in order to
28. See JEREMY BRECHER ET AL., GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 1-19 (2000).
29. Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900 (1996-97).
30. President Clinton seemingly sought to make his second term legacy a bold geopolitical
attempt to flank our competitors. By calling for an entire Americas Free Trade Zone, he was
seeking to create an unprecedented North/South hemispheric trade axis capable of economically
resisting dominance by any other trade bloc. That effort continues. See E. Alden, A. Bounds, &
C. Dyer, The Americas: U.S. Push for Trade Pact Faces Hurdle, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb.
16, 2001.
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convince the finance sector to be serviced in the United States, primarily
by our nationals. If finance driven globalism is inevitable, the political
system must be able to promote a position of preeminence as a matter of
national interest.
B. With Foreign Nations: The Clause
Addressing the issue of foreign economic policymaking in their
own time, the Framers wrote the Foreign Commerce Clause to be a grant
of power separate from the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Framers
of the Constitution cannot be interpreted to have included separate
clauses within the same sentence of an enumerated power and have
meant the first clause written to have no independent meaning. It is not
mere surplusage. This is clear as a matter of grammar, the textual rela-
tion of Congressional power to other branches and other levels of gov-
ernment, and as a matter of Framer's intent.
The three commerce clauses have different relationships to differ-
ent sovereignties. Foreign commerce regulation must necessarily take
account of international laws and treaties, not only for implementation
of international obligations, but also for harmonization of domestic and
foreign market practices. After all the United States is the international
person for purposes of fulfilling international obligations, and foreign
states may hold the United States accountable for compliance with all
international obligations, whether effected by the federal government or
local officials. 31 Moreover, increasingly, the United States makes inter-
national agreements by Congressional-Executive agreements.32
Whether by treaty or statutory authority, these foreign policies must be
the supreme law of the land and therefore preempt competing state poli-
cies by occupation of the field of foreign affairs. Just as matters affect-
ing foreign commerce must be a broader power than the power to
regulate commerce among the states, so preemption under the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause must be greater because of its foreign policy
content than preemption involving domestic regulation. Police powers
of the states undoubtedly overlap interstate commerce powers in a way
that conduct of foreign policy of the nation cannot allow.
3 1. Notice the tension this creates between the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994 and Supp. V. 1999), and the Supreme Court's invention of states
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
32. See Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2001), where
the Court held that whether a Congressional-Executive Agreement (in this case NAFTA) must
follow Senate confirmation of treaties involves a political question unfit for judicial determination.
The district court had reached the merits arguing, "The Treaty Clause does not constitute the
exclusive means of enacting international commercial agreements, given Congress's plenary
powers to regulate foreign commerce under Art. I, § 8, and the President's inherent authority
under Article II to manage our nation's foreign affairs." Id. at 1302.
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The Foreign Commerce Clause by itself has had little doctrinal
elaboration which may contribute to an older misconception that since
the Interstate Commerce Clause is judicially unlimitable, the Foreign
Commerce Clause need not be reached as a source of legislative
power.33 Thus, the foreign commerce power remains unfit for judicial
limitations even if the current Court purports to find an internal limit to
interstate commerce. 34  However, if identical laws are unconstitutional
on the accident of whether Congress invokes the interstate clause or the
foreign clause, something is most probably wrong with the doctrine of
interstate commerce being promulgated, rather than asserting there are
no foreign policy issues included in regulating global economic activity.
The actual doctrinal history of the Foreign Commerce Clause has
been treated with remarkable consistency by the United States Supreme
Court, and across markedly different periods of Supreme Court ideology
of federalism and changing historical views on interstate commerce.
Not surprisingly, the economic dominance of globalism emerges
only in the past decade. After all, it took the Great Depression to finally
remove resistance to the notion that the relative value of goods and ser-
vices could no longer be limited to local, regionalized, or limited mar-
kets. Economically, the national common market had been established
substantially earlier than its recognition in court opinions."
While transportation may have linked some markets for more than
a century, it was unable to link consumers and goods across large dis-
33. This conception traces the reliance on the Interstate Commerce Clause subject only "to
the wisdom and judgment of the people" back to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
a judicial deference returned to in 1937 in Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and
reaffirmed in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34. Yet, for example, even experts on foreign affairs, such as Professor Louis Henkin, are
subject to misinterpretation on this point. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1972). Henkin treats the subsidiary question of preemption as if the dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause describes the same relationship of state and federal interest as that of
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. In the seventies, the Supreme Court found no
enforceable limits on interstate commerce power. Dormancy under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, or indeed directions under the Export-Import clause, assumed Congressional policy
controlled the national common market. If local differences counseled regional actions, Congress
could choose whether to consent to state controls. The Interstate Commerce Clause was
unlimitable when the Congress acted. There was no occasion to base federal policy power
extension on foreign commerce control. Its doctrinal separation and the exclusivity of the
commerce clauses are reduced to footnotes. In reading Henkin, it must be remembered that
preemption succeeds to an act of admitted federal sovereignty. The second edition allocates only
two pages on the topic, acknowledging but not analyzing the relevance of United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), to foreign commerce, conceding the point of this article, the connection
between the global economy and foreign policy, to be a barrier to continue simply assuming the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses provided the same legislative powers.
35. See the origins of the substantial relationship doctrine of Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB in the
1914 Shreveport Rate Case, 324 U.S. 342 (1914), a suppressed doctrine under the dominant
ideology of dual sovereignty supporting liberty as contract.
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tances quickly until this century. By the 1930's, rapid technological
change and mass production created an oversupply of goods that could
not be cleared from the market even with the advances in transporta-
tion.36 While the long run could be relied upon to shake out failing
producers to regain an equilibrium of supply and demand, the accompa-
nying lowered demand of the unemployed for goods had created an
oversupply of labor as well. Surpluses of people rotting in the fields and
streets could not be stomached in the same way as unwanted refrigera-
tors, corn, or milk. Starving people wanted to restabilize the market
starting yesterday, not a promise of market self-correction in the long
run. Yet a politically isolated Supreme Court allowed states and their
individual constituencies to opt out of nationally coordinated solutions
to short term market gluts convincing none of the hungry of the fairness
and legitimacy of balkanized markets propped up by old legal
formalisms.37
Until the late 1970's, the Supreme Court's complete deference to
the only legislative forum representing all of us - consumers, produc-
ers, labor, and capital, and the interdependence of all of us produced by
the increasing rationalization of supply and demand - allowed Con-
gress via the Supremacy Clause to supplant great areas of formerly state
policymaking. The need to regulate or not to regulate had to expand to
meet the changed nature of modem market operation.38 Resort to the
Foreign Commerce Clause during this time was unnecessary in the light
of the expanded interstate commerce clause.39 But, the dying regime of
states' rights could not have controlled the Foreign Commerce Clause
anyway:
The principle of duality in our system of government does not touch
the authority of the Congress in the regulation of foreign com-
merce .... In international relations and with respect to foreign inter-
course and trade the people of the United States act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power. There is thus
no violation of the principle which petitioner invokes, for there is no
encroachment on the power of the State as none exists with respect to
the subject over which the federal power has been exerted. To permit
the States and their instrumentalities to import commodities for their
own use, regardless of the requirements imposed by the Congress,
would undermine, if not destroy, the single control which it was one
of the dominant purposes of the Constitution to create.40
36. See ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1995).
37. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
39. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation? Federal Powers vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1277 (1999).
40. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57, 59 (1933).
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Infrequency of use, however, did not mean ignorance of the For-
eign Commerce Clause by the courts. By any method of constitutional
interpretation - plain language, original intent, structure of the docu-
ment, ratification, historical evolution, values of liberty, contemporary
contextual realism - the Foreign Commerce Clause is central to our
constitutional system and to continuing faith in the rule of law.
First, reviewing the plain language of the three commerce sub-
clauses contained in the Constitution, reveals that they are preposition-
ally different. Congress has the power to "regulate commerce with for-
eign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.""a
For example, trading with the Indian tribes, a separate, though sur-
rounded, sovereignty, is not considered to present the same regulatory
issues as commerce among the states, no matter that the presence or
absence of state government might theoretically change relative domes-
tic powers.42
Second, under an original intent interpretation, the Framers, and
those in early government, for reasons other than future economic
globalism, were vitally and constitutionally concerned with the regula-
tion of commerce with foreign nations. 43 First, the economic reality was
that the survival of independence hinged upon strengthened foreign
commerce and the remaining need to import many essentials from
England and Europe. Also, historically in the early days of Enlighten-
ment, market succession to mercantilism meant the, market was separat-
ing from government command. 4 Ideologically, much of the revolution
was fought over market independence from the British crown's control
and taxation. Further, as a matter of political-economy, constitutional
ratification required a national guarantee of foreign commerce regula-
tion, as also embodied in the various slavery clauses of the text.
Third, however important the federalist/anti-federalist debate over
the origin of state and national domestic power, or today, over the devo-
lution versus creation of national sovereignty underlying constitutional
powers, the international legal powers of government have universally
been restricted to the Nation. The Framers understood this point to be a
matter of international law, which a revolutionary regime questing for
foreign recognition could never ignore. Similarly, the "One Voice" the-
ory of presidential negotiations has frequently been expressed in
Supreme Court decisions,45 and explicitly forbidden to the states. States
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
42. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 591-92 (1832).
43. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4, 5 (John Jay), No. 42 (James Madison), No. 80 (Alexander
Hamilton).
44. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
45. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see also Michael G.
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may only negotiate agreements with foreign governments with Con-
gress's approval under the Compact Clause.46
Our greatest Justice and constitutionalist even wrote on the subject.
The clause was important to John Marshall's entire system of constitu-
tional interpretation in the landmark domestic power case of Gibbons v.
Ogden.47 Marshall Wrote:
But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Con-
gress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. It
would be a very useless power, if it could not pass those lines. The
commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the
whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it.
The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction,
pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and fur-
nish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to
regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists.
If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or
terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be
exercised within a State.48
In the previous paragraph in the opinion, on the other hand, Mar-
shall acknowledges that, regarding interstate commerce, some economic
activities must be considered local, as they are purely internal to a par-
ticular state. It is thus significant that Marshall both understood the For-
eign Commerce Clause to be a separate power and found no internal
geographic limits on economic regulation as a matter of foreign affairs.
"With foreign nations" is a matter of sovereignty, and is distinguished
from mere commerce "among the States."49
In Chirac v. Chirac,5" the Court was faced with the issue of
whether property legally escheatable by Maryland must nonetheless be
given to French inheritors under a treaty in force at the time of death, but
subsequently broken. Holding the foreign affairs issue to be paramount,
Marshall wrote in his opinion:
[The Treaty] renders the performance of the condition a useless for-
mality .... This rule is changed by the treaty; and it seems to the
Court that the new rule applies to all cases as well to those where the
lands have descended by virtue of the [state] act as to those where
Keeley, Comment, Barclay's Bank PLC v. The Franchise Tax Board: Has the Supreme Court
Emasculated the One Voice Doctrine?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J 133 (1995).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
48. Id. at 195.
49. Professor Bernard Oxman suggested that a careful reading of Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchange, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), also implies that the Foreign Commerce
Clause is a more expansive power than that of the domestic clause.
50. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
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lands have been acquired without its aid. The general power to dis-
pose "without limitation," which is given by the treaty, controls the
particular power to enfeoff within ten years, which is given by the
Act of Maryland.5'
While the federal power to make treaties like the one at issue in Chirac
stems from the Constitutional grant of control of foreign affairs, not
from Congress's commerce power per se, there is simply no role for the
states, however much the local power sensibly concerns local land.
Chirac set the table for the modem reiteration of foreign affairs exclu-
sivity in the face of the strongest and most traditional of state concerns,
descent of property.
The most direct holding on the scope of the Foreign Commerce
Clause, Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States,
revisits the intergovernmental immunity issue of McCulloch albeit in the
converse, whether the federal government may tax a state entity in the
name of foreign policy. The opinion speaks both to the preemptive
effect of the power over foreign commerce and to the prohibition of
judicial adventure to interfere with the pure policy decisions in regulat-
ing this commerce:
The Tariff Act of 1922 is entitled - "An Act to provide revenue, to
regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries
of the United States, and for other purposes." The Congress thus
asserted that it was exercising its constitutional authority "to regulate
Commerce with Foreign Nations." The words of the Constitution
"comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on
between this country and any other to which this power does not
extend." It is an essential attribute of the power that it is exclusive
and plenary. As an exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited,
qualified or impeded to any extent by state action .... 12 [T]he judi-
cial department may not attempt in its own conception of policy to
distribute the duties thus fixed by allocating some of them to the
exercise of the admitted power to regulate commerce .... The pur-
pose to regulate foreign commerce permeates the entire congressional
plan ...... In international relations and with respect to foreign inter-
course and trade the people of the United States act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power.... To permit
states and their instrumentalities to import commodities for their own
use, regardless of the requirements imposed by the Congress, would
undermine, if not destroy, the single control which it was one of the
51. Id. at 274.
52. 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933).
53. Id. at 58.
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dominant purposes of the Constitution to create. . . .5 The principle
of duality in our system of government does not touch the authority
of the Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce.55
Specifically regarding American citizens' future competitiveness,
national preemption of state legislation regulating labor pools is a com-
plete power. According to Hines v. Davidowitz, "Our system of govern-
ment is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less
than the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from
local interference."56 The classic modem precedent on foreign policy
preemption, Zschernig v. Miller, which defined the exclusiveness of fed-
eral power over foreign economic affairs, concludes:
For we conclude that the history and operation of this Oregon statute
make clear that § 111.070 is an intrusion by the State into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress57 .... The practice of state courts in withholding remit-
tances to legatees residing in Communist countries or in preventing
them from assigning them is notorious. The several States, of course,
have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates.
But those regulations must give way if they impair the effective exer-
cise of the Nation's foreign policy.58
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Zschernig quoted the Chinese
Exclusion Case which prohibited state interference with federal control
over immigration, which has been seen as a tool to either fill the labor
market's need for domestic workers or to protect American workers and
their jobs by Congressional adjustment of visa quotas. Stewart quoted:
"For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power. ' '1 9
Earlier in Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, the
Supreme Court held that regulation of immigration at the port of New
York for purely local conditions was preempted:
A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions
on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations, must of
necessity be national in its character. It is more than this; for it may
properly be called international. It belongs to that class of laws
which concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other
54. Id. at 59.
55. id. at 57.
56. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
57. Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
58. Id. at 440.
59. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889)).
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nations and governments. 60
But after 200 years, the current Court has suggested that states may dis-
criminate against other states' citizens through the market participation
of state owned businesses if Congress has been silent. 61 This judicial
development in itself hardly squares with the adoption of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, attempting to relax immunities to interna-
tional adjudication over market activities.62
In the last term, the Supreme Court narrowly decided two cases on
preemption grounds, avoiding the question of whether the new state sov-
ereign immunity in combination with market participation, sub silentio,
might overturn the prohibition on states pursuing an independent foreign
policy from that of the nation.63 In United States v. Locke, 64 a Washing-
ton State regulation designed to reduce the risk of pollution from ships
was found to directly interfere with national trade legislation on tanker
characteristics as obligations of international treaties. The most direct
act of a state as a market participant occurred in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council.65 Massachusetts acted as a market participant
by purchasing market goods and services for the state. Yet, state entities
were forbidden from dealing with companies doing business in Burma
(now Myammar), because of its brutal dictatorship. Thus, the Court was
forced to decide whether a state could, as socialized market participants
be free to discriminate against citizens outside the state in contradiction
of both a common market and the nation's ability to conduct trade and
other foreign policy. The Constitution would be turned on its head. But
there is a greater danger. States could potentially use this new sovereign
immunity doctrine to shield state market power from private law reme-
dies. The resulting doctrine would destroy the nation's ability to con-
duct foreign policy without state embarrassments and deviations. Other
nations and their nationals' interests in trade negotiations would be sig-
nificantly lowered. Furthermore, the realistic accountability of regula-
tion by Congress, would be removed, from the only forum representing
aggregate competing interests in governmental decisions.66 These con-
sequences taken cumulatively, threaten authentic democracy as the basis
of constitutional legitimacy and the rule of law.
60. Henderson v. Wickham, Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875)
(emphasis in original).
61. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994 and Supp. V. 1999).
63. For a fuller discussion of the federalism issues raised, see Mark Tushnet, Globalization
and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000).
64. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
65. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
66. For further critique, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine; Judicial
Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 Loy. L.A. REV. 1283 (2000).
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The Court struck down the Massachusetts legislation because it
directly conflicted with authorized Presidential sanctions imposed upon
the Burmese regime by the Congress.67 Yet, it remains to be seen if
there is room under Crosby to maintain international economic diplo-
macy where Congress has delegated statutory authority, suggesting dor-
mant preemption. Justice Souter, writing for the Crosby majority,
seemingly argues that foreign policy, including foreign economic policy,
is exclusive to the federal government:
This clear mandate and invocation of exclusively national power
belies any suggestion that Congress intended the President's effective
voice to be obscured by state or local action.
Again, the state Act undermines the President's capacity, in this
instance for effective diplomacy. It is not merely that the difference
between the state and federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions
threaten to complicate discussions; they compromise the very capac-
ity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing
with foreign governments. We need not get into any general consid-
eration of limits of state action affecting foreign affairs to realize that
the Presidents maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to
bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy with-
out exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent
political tactics. When such exceptions do qualify his capacity to
present a coherent position on behalf of the national economy, he is
weakened, of course, not only in dealing with the Burmese regime,
but in working together with other nations in hopes of reaching com-
mon policy and "comprehensive" strategy.68
Importantly, the Court notes that the self interest that the Rehnquist
Court usually applauds in municipal democracies inevitably interferes
with foreign policy making.
C. The Global Economy and False Federalism:
United States v. Lopez6
9
It is in Lopez that the Supreme Court delivered a potentially Consti-
tution-changing decision on the scope of Congressional authority under
the Article I, section 8, power to regulate commerce among the states.
Reasoning that the federal structure of the Constitution demands judicial
limitation of the enumerated and limited power to regulate commerce
among the states, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in Lopez controver-
sially reversed sixty years of consistent doctrinal deference to Con-
67. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
68. Id. at 381-82 (citation omitted).
69. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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gress's ability to regulate any activity relating to the health of the
national economy. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously
defined authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a
recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way busi-
ness was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been
local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But
the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce
Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. 70
But, he concludes that the continuing deference established over sixty
years must be ended, stating that, "[t]o do so would require us to con-
clude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose
something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are
unwilling to do."'"
Despite little attempt at internal coherence in the "we just won't do
it" standard, the Lopez opinion stands as a potentially crippling barrier to
competitiveness in nation-state negotiation over the terms of political
control of the globalized market.
The failure of Lopez reasoning, however, is only of secondary
importance to the main point of this essay. The more important ques-
tion, however, not addressed in Lopez, is whether this opinion has any
relevance to Congressional power over commerce with foreign nations
and the exclusive national power to conduct foreign affairs. The inco-
herence of the opinion is important in the first instance because the
entire Rehnquist system of Constitutional interpretation depends on the
Court's finding a workable explanation of how and when interstate com-
merce power terminates within an unbroken market of supply and
demand. Limiting federal power, no matter how arbitrarily, devolves
policymaking to state and local governments.72 Over time such pure
policy making by judges setting arbitrary distributions of authority will
become hopelessly confused and unseemly, just as happened to National
League of Cities' "traditional, state concerns" attempt to explain that a
commuter railroad was not traditional, but a mass transit line was. 73 The
70. Id. at 556.
71. Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted).
72. Contrast the view of Chief Justice Rehnquist that judges have no business second
guessing the democratic reasons for state regulations when Congress has not yet acted, to his
unexplained new found ability to do precisely the same second guessing where Congress has
spoken. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
73. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Lopez doctrine similarly has no beginning and no end. This is true
whether the formal language of Jones & Laughlin, aimed at distinguish-
ing the Liberty as Contract model of the Constitution from the return to
John Marshall's understanding of national power, permits the word play
of intended limits. After all, the Rehnquist Court assertions depend
upon word manipulation of "among the several states" nie "interstate"
nie "not Intrastate." The Lopez reasoning has and can have no relevance
to the now more important question of Congressional power over com-
merce with foreign nations, and the exclusive national power to conduct
foreign affairs.
Moreover, if the Foreign Commerce Clause means something, as
surely it must, such power logically combines concern for national eco-
nomic regulation with necessary considerations of foreign relations.
Make no mistake. Lopez is wrongly decided on its own terms. And
analysis of the Foreign Commerce Clause makes this even clearer.
Any activity that affects the international market of supply and
demand for finance, goods, services, labor, land; all that and more non-
market behavior, must be regulated, sometimes subsidized, by Congress
as a matter of foreign policy, and negotiated through the sole voice of
negotiation in international frameworks and institutions. Under the For-
eign Commerce Clause, Congress must be able to extend power to intra-
state activities by definition, and the judiciary becomes lawless and
renegade if it usurps the functional powers given solely to the other two
branches.
III. DESPERATELY SEEKING FEDERALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT
A. Lopez and the Constitutional Contradiction Between International
Competitiveness and Market Participation in State
Service Delivery
At the time of its framing, an unforeseen potential contradiction
was structured into the Constitution; it was thought to be one of the
major devices of checking and balancing the factionalism inherent in
Madisonian political theory. The Framers choose the creation of a
strong, but limited, federal government reserving residual, general police
power for decentralized states. This scheme seemed like an extension
and repair of the previous government under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. It was, however, much more. Such a division was necessitated by
the prevailing enlightenment understanding that liberty depended upon
protecting property to be used by individuals to satisfy their separate
desires. Most importantly, without the preservation of local and regional
economic base differences, the Constitutional document would never
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have been ratified.74
Such preservation of local economic autonomy, including slavery,
seemed natural. While the prosperity of the nation depended upon for-
eign trade and a domestic common market, demanded national regula-
tion of the interstate transportation of goods, much of the commerce by
necessity was purely local. Time and distance made a pure national
market factually impossible. So, the Framers, included the limited
power over interstate commerce, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Supremacy Clause.
At the same time, if states are to exist at all, the power to react to
local emergencies and unchangeable localized conditions, must be
decentralized. Surely, any minimalistic notion of sovereignty must
allow a government to raise taxes from its own constituents and to redis-
tribute those resources in the form of services, goods, or law. Thus, if
the Tenth Amendment protects this minimal sovereign autonomy of tax
based market participation from federal control, then if the only power
of Congress to reach interstate commerce exempted such market entities,
the Supremacy Clause would become a truism that national power
extends to the market as previously socialized by the state. In turn that
would permit federal control of foreign relations and exclusive federal
powers only once the states have acted, an extraordinary claim about
federalism.
But, we no longer live in the Eighteenth century. The Framers
could not foresee the new global economy. Perhaps theoretically, either
the Tenth Amendment or the Supremacy Clause is a placeholder
allowing what will be kept by the other sphere to be a mere residual of
whichever sphere of regulation will be made the primary sphere by judi-
cial interpretation. But there are limits to judicial adventures in political
theory as well as limits to enumerated powers.
In this time in history supremacy must be protected. The power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations must as a matter of international
law be Nation-al. It cannot be shared. If the Supremacy Clause has any
substance, foreign policy is Nation-al, and the Tenth Amendment is
merely a truism.
What was obvious before Lopez was that every good or service, no
matter how local or non-economic in character or extent, is linked to
every other action valued in a market driven by the forces of supply and
demand. A common market's health depends on its being common.
This means there can be no local opt outs or local retaliation against the
74. Without the constitutionalized protection of slavery, and an accompanying restriction of
the content of constitutional rights to positivistic protections, the Southern States would never
have ratified the Constitution.
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government or any foreign citizens. The common market cannot be bal-
anced through judicial or other means, without ignoring the fact of sup-
ply and demand. Markets only exist under the explicit enforcement (i.e.,
regulation) under the authority of the State (not states). Lack of interfer-
ence in so called market activities is itself a method of redistribution,
thus, always an active choice rather than government "inaction." There
is no equilibrium, no balance point, no reconciliation, no matter how
disingenuous or how formalistic the cover-up of these two constitutional
sources of power intentions under national decision making.
As a matter of reality that no judge or judicial opinion can change,
the two parts of our constitutional scheme must pass each other in the
night, never meeting, regardless of their simultaneity of overlapping
jurisdictional authority taken in isolation. In a democracy, we vote on
which incommensurable prevails and, in a democracy, we vote in the
only forum representing all those affected - the national Congress. If
the constituencies in Congress would vote to follow a path like Lopez,
competitiveness and thus all of our standard of living will be in some
measure reduced. So be it; that is why we vote.
Yes, the mere existence of the states in some sense makes the peo-
ple of this country less competitive by envisioning a crazy quilt of dif-
fering local regulations. Lack of uniformity in turn reduces their very
freedom and mobility as conceived by pursuit of markets for their
resources.7 5 Whether the outcome is good or bad, whether something
other than economic liberty is desirable, as I hope it would be, is irrele-
vant. The question is at what level of government should the political
democracy set the terms of competition, period.
B. The Importance of "No Taxation Without Representation"
Against this global economic and political reality, the Rehnquist
Court incoherently pursues a social agenda of increasing local powers
that protect the right of personal exclusion from property protections
within enclaves of buffered and gated wealth.76 Often, this municipal
autonomy is defended as necessary to preserve Brandeisian local experi-
mentation and local options in such fields labeled as traditionally state
controlled, such as education. The Court thus leads the constitutional
debate to interminable jurisdictional wrangling over state and federal
government actors, while avoiding the arena affecting the population
75. On the importance of federal judicial protection of Congressional statutory requirements
of uniformity in business regulation in another setting (ERISA), see Egelhof v. Egelholf, 532 U.S.
141 (2001).
76. See Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong With
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000).
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most directly - the international economy. This is no accident. The
judicial overturning of Congressional power to regulate commerce
among the states becomes anachronistic and irrelevant to a world econ-
omy of negotiated trade regimes among nations.
The simultaneous attempt to limit the scope of federal civil and
Constitutional rights77 and Congressional powers, 78 work together pro-
tecting a liberty of exclusion of "undesired" citizens from legally pro-
tected local enclaves of propertied wealth.79 The resulting ability to
locally secede from joint community problems depends on state political
power to structure such local communities' powers to insulate. Such
powers under the current Court must be made independent from appeal
to either Congress or the federal courts by the mass of the population of
urban areas, even if the seceding communities of wealth ultimately
depend on the availability and price of the labor their residents employ.
Such a program should not succeed, and will not succeed without a
workable in practice solution to the "federalism problem" of foreign
affairs. The house of cards falls here. It should. The theory behind
twenty years of Court activism is undemocratic and repressive and
regressive. Localities are important to liberty, but the stability of com-
munities will evaporate without protection of their economic bases, and
the wish to call our communities home will follow without a fair link to
democracy in choosing how our communities of people can and will
compete. 80
In order to justify any judicial opinion enabling the judiciary to set
the relative limits of federal versus state legislation, and therefore to
look some place other than a democratic forum for that resolution, any
Justice will have to meet three doctrinal burdens: (1) Is there any method
for resolving the Constitution's contradiction that can be explained as
anything more than rejecting the democratic resolution of incommen-
surables? (2) Is there a doctrinal formulation consistent with the answer
to one, which also workably distinguishes between cases in fact? (3)
77. See Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975); Lyons
v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc.
Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
78. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Bd. of Trustees of University
of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
79. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy
of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 247 (2000).
80. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000).
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Does this doctrine not only work, but can it be adopted without over-
ruling McCulloch v. Maryland's principle of democracy and supremacy,
"No taxation without representation"?
Surely there are many good reasons why, in the only forum repre-
senting all of us, we will trade off trade maximization, and wealth max-
imization for other values, including local options, experimentation, and
different mixes of services. Especially under our bicameral Congress,
the states themselves are represented in Congress. The constituents
electing mayors, governors, and state legislators, were after all the same
constituents electing congressmen. More importantly, the Senate pro-
vides each state with two votes regardless of population differences.
But, just as surely as adequate representation, in turn, no segment of us
gets to impose their will on the rest of us.
Authentic democracy depends upon popular participation in the
forums representing all those affected by the decision. Participation
depends upon fair political process and not divorcing the enjoyment of
economic value from the production of economic value. If the masses
of our population cannot be employed, or if their employment will not
sustain a living wage, democracy will serve the few at the expense of the
many. There is no good constitutional reason to make that outcome a
self-fulfilling prophecy by blocking access to the only forum by which
the working majority of our population can pursue the preservation of an
economic base of marketable employment. More than jobs are in jeop-
ardy. More than standard of living is in jeopardy. More than the per-
sonal security flowing from stable social institutions is in jeopardy. A
livable polity of democratic stakeholding is in jeopardy.8'
Our Constitution should be interpreted to protect the popular sover-
eigns. There is no better way to do so than by reinforcing democracy.82
There is no worse way than by protecting privilege and exclusion; espe-
cially when such privilege owes no allegiance to the producers of wealth
who cannot escape the locations upon which nations have arisen.
Indeed, the health of local and regional labor pools demands a local
focus, but from a negotiated trade regime linking such pools globally, it
cannot be based on the antiquated understanding of consumption auton-
omy promulgated by the Rehnquist Court.83
81. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
82. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
83. For a third view begging the challenge posed here, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
A. We the People do the Work Around Here
The key to community viability is human capital investment. Local
geographies may have competitive advantages for many naturally, and
publicly or privately produced reasons. The one economic variable that
is generic to any exploitation of pre-existing advantage, though, is pro-
ductivity. Productivity under free conditions can be changed most
through education. In our history, even when funded by nationally col-
lected revenues, states have largely governed education through their
municipal governments and decentralized special districts called school
boards. Education has become the linchpin of communities' social val-
ues, morality, religion, and economy. "If you do not like where you
live, move to a more congenial social environment." This shibboleth
has always been used politically to prevent uniformity feared to result if
uniform national requirements in education were ever attempted. Chief
Justice Rehnquist acknowledges and rejects the Congressional policy
involved in United States v. Lopez:
The Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school zone
may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to
affect the functioning of the national economy in two ways. First, the
costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population. Second,
violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas
within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. The Government
also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial
threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environ-
ment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a
less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would have an adverse effect
on the Nation's economic well-being. As a result, the Government
argues that Congress could rationally have concluded that § 922(q)
substantially affects interstate commerce.84
But educational performance standards under individual states'
control potentially decrease mobility and competitiveness. Justice
Breyer states in his dissent:
[T]hat four percent of American high school students (and six percent
of inner-city high school students) carry a gun to school at least occa-
sionally; that 12 percent of urban high school students have had guns
fired at them; that 20 percent of those students have been threatened
with guns; and that, in any 6-month period, several hundred thousand
schoolchildren are victims of violent crimes in or near their schools.
And, they report that this widespread violence in schools throughout
84. 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995) (citations omitted).
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the Nation significantly interferes with the quality of education in
those schools.85
Justice Breyer then documents the importance of educational attain-
ment to the health of the national common market:
Education, although far more than a matter of economics, has long
been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy. When this
Nation began, most workers received their education in the work-
place, typically (like Benjamin Franklin) as apprentices. As late as
the 1920's, many workers still received general education directly
from their employers-from large corporations, such as General
Electric, Ford, and Goodyear, which created schools within their
firms to help both the worker and the firm. Throughout most of the
19th century fewer than one percent of all Americans received secon-
dary education through attending a high school. As public school
enrollment grew in the early 20th century, the need for industry to
teach basic educational skills diminished. But, the direct economic
link between basic education and industrial productivity remained.
Scholars estimate that nearly a quarter of America's economic
growth in the early years of this century is traceable directly to
increased schooling; that investment in "human capital" (through
spending on education) exceeded investment in "physical capital" by
a ratio of almost two to one; and that the economic returns to this
investment in education exceeded the returns to conventional capital
investment. 86
Furthermore, access to international markets depends increasingly
on the general flexibility of today's working population, Justice Breyer
continued:
"[o]ver the long haul the best way to encourage the growth of high-
wage jobs is to upgrade the skills of the work force .... [B]etter-
trained workers become more productive workers, enabling a com-
pany to become more competitive and expand."
Increasing global competition also has made primary and secondary
education economically more important. The portion of the Ameri-
can economy attributable to international trade nearly tripled between
1950 and 1980, and more than 70 percent of American-made goods
now compete with imports. Yet, lagging worker productivity has
contributed to negative trade balances and to real hourly compensa-
tion that has fallen below wages in 10 other industrialized nations.87
Empirically, how has local educational autonomy performed? How pre-
pared are our children for the intensity of world competition?88 Justice
85. Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 620-22 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
88. KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (D. Crabbard ed., 2000).
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Breyer concludes:
At least some significant part of this serious productivity problem is
attributable to students who emerge from classrooms without the
reading or mathematical skills necessary to compete with their Euro-
pean or Asian counterparts, and, presumably, to high school dropout
rates of 20 to 25 percent (up to 50 percent in inner cities). Indeed,
Congress has said, when writing other statutes, that "functionally or
technologically illiterate" Americans in the work force "erod[e]" our
economic "standing in the international marketplace," Pub.L. 100-
418, s 6002(a)(3), 102 Stat. 1469, and that "[o]ur Nation is... paying
the price of scientific and technological illiteracy, with our productiv-
ity declining, our industrial base ailing, and our global competitive-
ness dwindling." H.R.Rep. No. 98-6, pt. 1, p. 19 (1983).89
The premise of the Lopez rhetoric is that the gun possession statute
in question is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment. The federal act's enforcement
threatened under that authority invades the sovereignty of the state.
This is the same debate made over jurisdiction in the harvesting of
migratory birds crossing state geography. At the heart of Missouri v.
Holland was a treaty between the United States and Canada to ensure
that migratory birds would be protected in certain periods because of the
economic and resource importance of such birds.90 If state hunting per-
mits sanctioned the destruction of migratory flocks as they traversed the
local geography, then the more important long term benefits of the birds'
international movement to foreign citizens would be unfairly eliminated
by a political minority's jurisdiction. This is why the interstate com-
merce power must be able to stop monopolistic state balkanization of the
market. It is even more important when market regulations, such as
migration, must be concluded in a treaty. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes contradicts the Lopez reasoning in his Holland opinion:
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amend-
ment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States,
because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated
expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the authority of the
United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the
land. If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity
of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the Government. The language of the Consti-
tution as to the supremacy of treaties being general, the question
before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the
89. See supra note 84.
90. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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present supposed exception is placed. 9 '
Thus, Justice Holmes concludes, "Here a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by
national action in concert with that of another power. The subject matter
is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat
therein. 92
Nor is the Holland doctrine thought by Holmes to be limited to
treaties and enabling legislation only. According to Holmes, the same
supremacy principle applies to all Congressional powers where individ-
ual states are not competent. For instance, it applies when one state
might hoard part of a market promoting trade retaliation by the other
states and citizens. Their remedy must be retaliatory since, by defini-
tion, the outsiders cannot vote in the poaching state.
So, should American labor be less protected than migratory birds?
Both, the incentives of the finance driven economy to acquire flexible
skills that are mobile, and the shifting geography of jobs in the compo-
nent assembly production and service sectors, make economic activity
part of a fluid market process like migration. In Local 116 v. United
States Secretary of Labor, the union appealed the Secretary of Labor's
determination that its workers did not qualify for benefits under the
Trade Assistance Act of 1974 because the local plant firing them had not
lost gross product revenue because of new product line sales.93 The
court found otherwise because the lost jobs from the discontinued prod-
uct increased the need for import substitutions. In short, local compo-
nent production affects the internationally assembled final product. The
court the reasoned:
Labor, however, ignores the fact that Honeywell could have
increased sales and/or profitability by out-sourcing production work
to foreign firms and/or affiliates, thereby slashing its domestic
91. Id. at 432.
92. Id. at 435.
93. 793 F. Supp. 1094 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992). Honeywell operates plants in York,
Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; Golden Valley, Minnesota; and Amiens, France. The products
manufactured at these various Honeywell plants supplement the Fort Washington product line.
Ms. Brown also found these plants are not considered by the Company to be competitive with the
products produced at the Fort Washington plant. Specifically, the products made at the subject
plant consist of controllers, programmers, recorders, motors, pyrometers, multiplexers,
transmitters and valves. According to company officials, production at the subject plant since
about June 1987 primarily consists of assembly work. Honeywell purchases printed circuit
boards, both domestic and foreign made, to be assembled into instruments and control systems.
Id. at 1095.
The court continued, "On May 18, 1990, [the Department of] Labor determined that the
workers formerly employed at the Honeywell Fort Washington plant were not eligible to receive
worker adjustment assistance benefits on the basis that sales production did not decline." Id. at
1096.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
workforce requirements as alleged by Mr. McKenna, President of
Local 116 from March 1989 through March 1991. These allegations
were not investigated by Labor and should have been. Although
Honeywell's profitability and sales may not have been negatively
impacted by such out-sourcing to foreign companies, its domestic
workforce has been significantly impacted because the total sales and
production figures are not broken down and therefore do not reflect
the impact of imports.94
In finding that the Trade Assistance Act applied to terminated workers
whose jobs were lost by either lost sales or import substitution, the court
reasoned that production, like migration, transits local stopping points in
a fluent and everchanging pattern of local conditions.95
Under more democratic functioning, the debate on overcoming sub-
ordination will at least include argument on access to conditions of pro-
duction under a division of labor that includes and allows all to
participate meaningfully at a meaningful time.96 After all, each of us
should be more acutely aware of how prevailing divisions of both econ-
omized and socialized work in daily life permit us, if at all, to have any
self-control over how we each make our lives. We should also be aware
of how much of that access to productive conditions are the product of
political subordination.
Taking the language and structure of the Constitution seriously
means seeing the document as a dynamic blueprint, the purpose of
which is democratic social organization. The social relations necessary
to produce organization depend upon the social relations necessary to
produce the human conditions whereby a correlative organization makes
sense. To make sense of these required relations, it must be recognized
that people are defined, in part, by their membership in multiple rela-
tionships and these relationships tie the division of labor to democracy.
We produce who we are, what our joint possibilities can be, and what
costs those possibilities will require. A fair organization must link rights
substantively to this inevitably inter-dependent social process.97 All
must be accountable and responsible, or privilege will be imposed over
those whose experience of their identity is subordinated.
Democracy is the decisional politics of free individuals. Free indi-
viduals, however, depend on the conditions of their interdependency
94. Id. at 1097.
95. Id. at 1095.
96. A substantive view of the Carolene Products judicial role will a priori lead to a
substantive version of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For a philosophical method
approximate to this view, but adopted on liberal grounds, see John Rawls' maxi-min principle in
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
97. See, e.g., David Abraham, Labor's Way: On the Successes and Limits of Socialist Politics
in Interwar and Post-World War H Germany, 28 INT'L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 1 (1985).
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within a complex division of labor. If each self takes the measure of
their power from their relations to the others within a system capable of
social stability, indeed social advance, then a kind of equivalency is nec-
essary for democracy in fact. That equality is not a license or a subsidy
to consume goods or cultural experience. Here lies liberalism's fatal
concession and mistake. Making distribution of wealth available for
consumption the key framework of social analysis, misses the point that
we make ourselves, we don't just buy our identities.98 Rather, it is equal
access to produce and contribute within a division of labor based on
mutual recognition of one's own self in the conditions experienced by
all others which is necessary to democracy in fact. Furthermore, it is the
risks of being subordinated in a prevailing, thus historical, division of
labor which leads us to demand democracy, and then authentic democ-
racy, as the only structure by which to solve social conflict over the
terms of social production.
If the system of rights is elaborated and extended under such
favorable circumstances, each citizen can perceive, and come to
appreciate, citizenship as the core of what holds people together. It
makes them at once dependent upon, and responsible for, each other.
They see that private and public autonomy presuppose each other in
maintaining and improving necessary conditions for preferred forms
of life. They intuitively realize that they can succeed in fairly regu-
lating their private autonomy only by making an appropriate use of
their civic autonomy, and that they are in turn, they are empowered to
do so only on a social basis that makes them, as private persons,
sufficiently interdependent. Thus, they learn to conceive citizenship
as the frame for that dialectic between legal and actual equality from
which fair and preferable living conditions for all citizens can
emerge.99
B. Protecting Jobs is Protecting Communities and a Competitive
Labor Force: Liberty as Stability and Mobility
One response to unemployment under external competitive pres-
98. Contingen[t work] makes sense when the worker is considered to be the
commodity or product produced, rather than a human being. A commodity does not
have a body, so it does not need health insurance. A product does not have a family,
so it does not need paid vacation or family leave. A commodity does not have a
future, so it does not need a pension, job security, training or promotional
opportunities. A product does not have a heart, soul or brain, so it does not need to
participate in the workplace community or decision making. A commodity does not
live, so it does not need a living wage.
Maria B. Ontiveros, A Vision of Global Capitalism that Puts Women and People of Color at the
Center, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 36 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
99. Jiirgen Habermas, The European Nation State Its Achievements and Its Limitations, On
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO JURIS. 125, 135 (1996).
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sure is the spitting into the wind approach of economic protectionism.
The main reasons to propose isolationism, economic and political, are
both disastrous in the near term. The economic claim is that sufficient
domestic demand exists to support the high regulatory costs of environ-
mental quality and high standards of living supported by high domestic
wages. At the same time, lower cost or lower wage countries engage in
unfair competition. Their impoverished populations would rather forego
fair labor standards or decent living environments in order to bid away
unprotected jobs. This is an unfair subsidy, however, to international
business that can only be afforded by those competitors in the short
term. Expectations will eventually rise in those countries. The political
argument adds that other countries will provide direct subsidies to their
own industries until our free marketeers are put out of business. Neither
argument works.
While these arguments may have been rational during the indus-
trial, State-capitalism era of our economy; the new, global finance capi-
talism demonstrates how irrational these arguments are. Economic
growth will cease as investment, which is already out of national con-
trol, simply ignores "uncompetitive" industries. Moreover, our consum-
ers will still want the advantages of cheaper goods produced elsewhere,
and no one wants our overpriced exports. At best, protectionist regula-
tions can only serve as immediate bargaining chips toward multilateral
agreements on international market regulations.
True stability of high wage, high living quality economic produc-
tion depends upon productivity superiority. If communities are not to be
continuously destroyed and replaced elsewhere, it will be because the
local labor force's ability to adapt and retain investment attractiveness
affords a stable economic base. World trade in the future will link
vibrant, highly qualified labor forces regardless of municipal boundaries
or domestic political organization. The nation may still provide emer-
gency risk pooling or cross subsidies as a matter of revenue and risk
efficiency, but the viability of the economic base will depend less on
geography than on the relative quality and productivity of the labor
force." ° As individuals become more mobile, specific locales will
become more vulnerable, and community populations more volatile. In
fact, some forms of labor will not be dependent upon geography. Mobil-
ity alone, however, does not diminish the human values of stable rela-
tionships, family support, and attractive living conditions. Moreover,
internationally, labor is the least mobile of all factors of production
except land, for which by definition there are international and cheaper
100. See Jack Lyne, The Skills Gap: U.S. Work Force Woes Complicate Business-Location
Equation, SrrE SFLECriON, Aug. 1992, at 642.
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substitutes. Economics may demand flexibility and mobility as impor-
tant to the experience of freedom, but this assumes that there is some-
where worthwhile to go!
The real question of federalism is not the protectionism of local
options, political exclusion of "undesirables," protection of geographic
property values, or refusal to acknowledge the dependence of accumu-
lated wealth on the production of captive labor living in urban cores.' 0'
The real question of contemporary federalism is the ability to suffi-
ciently promote the competitive viability of any population to enable the
creation of local institutions based upon stable relationships, (i.e.,
churches, cultural affinities, little leagues, the arts, and even diversity of
life choices). Freedom to be different is ultimately dependant upon the
labor force, not municipalities. Municipalities die, or become citadels
under siege, without an economic base. An economic base for mass
regional populations depends on the competitiveness of the population
as a labor force magnet of productivity for internationalized finance.
The Constitutional question is no longer, if it ever was, the relative
importance of centralized government versus local bureaucracy, unless
the only purpose is an anachronistic protection of past privilege. The
ability to set competitive economic policy, absent worldwide govern-
ment, is now a matter of foreign affairs.
C. To Preserve and High Tech Geographic Culture and Nations
Under Conditions of Finance Capital
It is sometimes predicted that globalism renders Nations irrelevant
and impotent, or that Nations will engage in "race to the bottom politics"
under conditions of prisoner's dilemmas. It is predicted that even the
wealthy social democracies of Europe will be forced to destroy their
unions and dismantle their welfare states, a la Reagan and Thatcher.
There is already pressure to do so. This is especially true under the
dominance of finance.
Finance seeks maximum return in the short run. Its instantaneous
mobility neither respects nor depends upon any geographic location. Its
decentralization creates vast inequality of bargaining power, even with
giant industrial concerns under conditions of flexible production and
automation; indeed, even versus most countries in the world.
While culture arises from geographical location and historical expe-
rience, it is somewhat portable. But mobility, risks homogenization,
thus minimizing diversity and threatening to compromise culture. If
101. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR (1996).
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geography and history count for any value in identity, indeed, if differ-
ence means anything at all to freedom, it will be because what we pro-
duce economically has some connection to the viability and stability of
institutions that define and support such differences. One can legislate
exclusion, but one cannot populate privileged exclusive enclaves with-
out an economic base to support that population. It makes better sense
to make one's population competitive and able to support community
institutions and interaction of persons within a region, than to expect
those who cannot afford the slopes of Aspen, the views of Monte Carlo,
or even a single family dwelling, to all move to a job in Thailand, Nige-
ria, Paraguay, or wherever else the labor population of the week happens
to be located. The degree of success in human capital development both
reflects and supports the authenticity of democracy. Workers need
stronger democratic practices, and vibrant democracy-in-fact needs
stronger worker's voices.
V. CONCLUSION: THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS A FOREIGN AFFAIR
The prohibitions against discrimination on entry of goods to the
United States, and against tax or regulatory protectionism by the states
set the historical stage to grant Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations. Such power is enumerated independently
from the power to regulate commerce among the states. Unless limited
by judicial review of the impact on an individual's Constitutional rights
of a particular exercise of Article I, section 8, clause 3; the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations is necessarily political; no judi-
cially enforceable limits are available. The federal power necessarily
reflects the degree of necessity that Congress govern even local activity
as it bears upon the competitiveness of every citizen in a global
economy.
Furthermore, judges cannot formulate a workable doctrinal formu-
lation of any judicial enforcement of such limits. Any ability to limit
Congress in the area of foreign affairs belongs to the people of the
United States via their representation through Congress and the Presi-
dency; and to the states as represented in the Senate expressly, and Con-
gress generally. Even if judges could formulate a usable doctrine, they
would still have to explain why the judiciary may legitimately contradict
a fair democratic vote. In addition, those judges would have to explain
how any doctrine can consistently exist with the foreign affairs powers
of the Nation. Finally, any doctrine must survive the "No taxation (or
regulation) without representation" requirements of Article I, sections 9
and 10, and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI as established in
McCulloch v. Maryland.
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The role of government in promoting production in a global econ-
omy becomes crucial to the standard of living of all citizens. Thus, all
citizens should have a say in the industrial/finance policies of the nation.
Even a traditional service function undertaken historically within an
individual state cannot be allowed to opt out of uniform and affordable
regulatory costs, which the international market for investment may or
may not be willing to bear. For example, education is investment in
human capital and will increasingly become one of the dominant vari-
ables in the locational stability of increasingly international, mobile jobs
and the less mobile domestic workforces bidding on such production.
When international product markets make it so, what is local becomes
global, or the local loses investment attention. To avoid familiar domes-
tic races to the bottom, national negotiation must seek favorable trade
terms for uniform competition in access to consumable goods, at the
same time promoting productivity and fair labor standards and a living
wage within local specialization and flexibility. Whether our children
will have jobs when they grow up, should not depend on the personal
whim of federal judges and their fondness for country club communities.
That is why Popular Sovereignty demands authentic democracy.
We the people, in order to protect our communities, and the jobs
and division of labor those communities depend upon, and therefore,
to provide the stability for a liberty based upon the relationships we
build, as well as the liberty of mobility upon which free associations
are premised, and which liberties belong to each of us; must be able
to decide on the priority and extent of Nation-State economic policy
in the only political forum open to all of us within an increasingly
global market, on any matter affecting commerce with Foreign
nations. 0 2
102. Author's variation on a constitutional theme.
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